Only critical vulnerabilities in the components listed below are eligible.
Rewards: up to $100,000 per vulnerability, paid in Grams or USDt, depending on severity. Large rewards may be subject to lock-up or vesting.
Submit a vulnerability description and exploitation scenario to @ton_bugs_bot. We reserve the right to decline review.
Most reports are processed within 90 days; LLM-generated spam may cause delays. For duplicates, only the earliest received report is considered.
Report validation workflow: TON Bug Bounty Self Check.
Repository: master branch only, latest global_version only.
Covered components: ✅ Validator Node, ✅ Full Node, ✅ Simplex Consensus.
Eligible impacts:
- ✅ Unauthorized manipulation of blockchain state or funds.
- ✅ Network halts.
- ✅ Node halts triggered by a single request.
All other components and impacts are not considered.
The absence of MisbehaviorProof in Simplex is known and is a low-priority work in progress. It is not critical to current operation and is planned as defense in depth. Reports about MisbehaviorProof are excluded.
- ❌ All OOM and DDoS attacks.
- ❌ Any attack initiated by a validator.
- ❌ Attacks requiring prior control of the local host, local files or libraries, runtime parameters, environment variables, startup flags, or other trusted operator inputs.
- ❌ Attacks requiring previously leaked private information, including private keys for ADNL, wallets, block signing, the control interface, or FullNodeMaster.
- ❌ Attacks requiring prior control of a majority of otherwise honest validators, including malformed blocks signed by a quorum or invalid network configuration approved by validator voting.
CHECK()failures and node crashes under a faulty quorum are intentional: halting is preferable to continued operation. - ❌ Issues that assume an extra-currency exists.
- ❌ Sybil attacks against the public overlay.
- ❌ Crashes or unexpected behavior in local tools, debug-only paths, or user-side workflows that do not affect normal node, service, or blockchain operation.
- ❌ Future timestamps exceeding their integer type's range, including the 2038 and 2106 problems.
- ❌ Issues involving unsynchronized lite servers.
- ❌ Validator control-interface misconfiguration.
- ❌ Catchain 1.0.
- ❌ Tonlib;
- ❌ RLDP 1/2.
- ❌ DHT Node.
- ❌ lite-client.
- ❌ Libemulator.
- ❌ Fift/FunC/Tolk compilers.
- ❌ Blockchain explorer.
- ❌ TON Storage, Payment Channels, TON Proxy, https-proxy, rldp-http-proxy.
✅ Only vulnerabilities causing loss of funds or unauthorized access to the validator server are eligible.
✅ Only vulnerabilities that lead to unauthorized control or ownership and unauthorized manipulation of funds are considered.
- ✅ Elector.
- ✅ Config.
- ✅ Wallet v1.
- ✅ Wallet v3.
- ✅ Wallet v4r2. ❌ Wallet plugins are excluded.
- ✅ Wallet v5.
- ✅ tg-wallet-v1.
- ✅ Multisig V2.
- ✅ Highload V3.
- ✅ Single Nominator 1.0 and 1.1.
- ✅ Nominator Pool V2.
- ✅ Standard Jettons: v2.1-tolk, v2.0-func, v1.2-func.
- ✅ Standard NFTs: v1.1-func, v1.1-tolk.
- ✅ TON DNS.
❌ All other smart contracts are excluded.
Elector: Known peculiarities of Elector are not bounty issues by themselves, including max_stake-related stake accounting/recovery behavior and ignoring bounce messages semantics. Also reports for elector-code issues should take into account that election_id is different each round, thus signatures for slashing fines can not be replayed.
Config: Known peculiarities of Config contract is that if validator voted positively for some proposal his vote (under specific conditions) can be replayed in different rounds without active validator participation.
Wallets: Deleted-wallet redeploy/reuse behavior by itself is not considered a vulnerability; wallet deletion should be treated as final, and old externals are expected to expire via short valid_until.
Nominator Pool V2: The reports below are not considered bounty issues:
- #23: Third-party stake recovery via
RecoverStakeUnrestricted. - #24: Unhandled
RecoverStakeErrorpaths causing round-rotation deadlock and permanent freezing of nominator funds. - #25: Missing zero-divisor check in
mulDivQuiet. - #26: Pool-deposit DoS caused by the dictionary depth limit (
MAX_NM_DEPTH = 15) incontracts/storage.tolk. - #27: Unhandled division by zero in
DepositMessagewhennominatorsAmount == 0, incontracts/utils.tolk. - #28.
- #29: Unhandled integer underflow in
get_nominator_datacausing an off-chain getter crash.
- ❌ Websites and frontends.
- ❌ SDKs and developer tools.
- ❌ Toncenter API.
❌ Third-party TON products are not covered. Many have separate bug bounty programs; check their websites for details.