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Clarify plaintext NFC visibility in the remote AA examples - #48
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nadimkobeissi merged 1 commit intoOct 8, 2026
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State that NFC guards prevent replacement but do not provide confidentiality, and that these models omit BAC/PACE Secure Messaging. Explain that the two-session remote_aa_bound.vp trace reads aaSig from NFC after injecting a challenge through nonce reuse, then encrypts the signature for the attacker's own bank session.
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While reading
remote_aa.vp, I noticed that the comment places the attacker on the internet, away from the passport. The model still exposes the NFC exchange as plaintext. Guards prevent replacement, but they don't hide the message contents. Secure Messaging established through BAC or PACE isn't modeled here.In the trace for
remote_aa_bound.vpat two sessions, nonce reuse lets the attacker inject a challenge. It then readsaaSigfrom the NFC exchange and encrypts it for its own session with the bank.I have updated the comments to explain where the attacker gets the signature. The models themselves haven't changed.