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45 changes: 45 additions & 0 deletions crates/rmcp/RUSTSEC-0000-0000.md
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```toml
[advisory]
id = "RUSTSEC-0000-0000"
package = "rmcp"
date = "2026-11-05"
url = "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f9-cp8h-jcj5"
references = ["https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/commit/3e0156c1eaf1573a1b878e2a8998d2fa2d0b1439"]
categories = ["denial-of-service"]
cvss = "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H"
keywords = ["mcp", "http", "memory-exhaustion"]
aliases = ["GHSA-c9f9-cp8h-jcj5"]

[versions]
patched = [">= 3.9.0"]
unaffected = ["< 0.2.0"]
```

# Unbounded response body buffering in Streamable HTTP clients

Before 3.9.0, the built-in Streamable HTTP clients in rmcp read non-streaming
HTTP response bodies into memory with no size limit. Both the reqwest client
(`transport-streamable-http-client-reqwest`) and the Unix socket client
(`transport-streamable-http-client-unix-socket`) were affected:

- `application/json` responses to POST requests were read in full before
parsing.
- Non-2xx responses were read in full for error reporting.

A malicious or compromised MCP server can answer with a body that never ends,
for example a chunked `application/json` response that streams whitespace. The
client buffers it until the process runs out of memory. This works during
`initialize`, before any authentication. On desktop or agent hosts, this
terminates the whole host application.

Server-sent event streams are not affected. Each event is already capped by
`max_sse_event_size`, and events are not accumulated.

The flaw was corrected in 3.9.0. Successful JSON bodies are limited to 16 MiB
and non-success bodies to 64 KiB. Bytes are counted while streaming, after
decompression. An oversized `Content-Length` is rejected before the body is
read, and an oversized body is rejected with
`StreamableHttpError::ResponseBodyTooLarge` instead of being truncated.

If you cannot upgrade, use a custom `StreamableHttpClient` that enforces a
response body limit, or connect only to trusted MCP servers.
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