🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection in text-to-speech

[omsingh02]

🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Command Injection. The application passed unescaped, user-controlled text directly into a powershell -Command invocation for text-to-speech. An attacker could craft a payload (e.g., escaping the double quotes) to execute arbitrary commands on the host Windows machine.
🎯 Impact: Arbitrary code execution on the underlying host system, leading to full system compromise.
🔧 Fix: Replaced direct string interpolation with a safe mechanism. The text payload is now Base64-encoded in Python (using utf-16le to match PowerShell's expected encoding), and decoded securely entirely within the PowerShell context, ensuring it is always evaluated as string data, never as executable code.
✅ Verification: Verified that tests pass (no regressions introduced) and manually verified that the script correctly executes standard T-T-S while rejecting payload escaping.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 6048120523041097137 started by @omsingh02

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