π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection in text-to-speech - #63
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix command injection in text-to-speech#63omsingh02 wants to merge 1 commit into
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Co-authored-by: omsingh02 <215121080+omsingh02@users.noreply.github.com>
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Command injection risk when interpolating untrusted text directly into a
subprocess.PopenPowerShell command using f-strings (e.g.,f'$synth.Speak("{text}")'). If the input contains PowerShell metacharacters or quotes, arbitrary commands could be executed.π― Impact: An attacker could execute arbitrary code on the host machine if they can control the text being spoken.
π§ Fix: Avoid direct string interpolation with untrusted input in
subprocess.Popenusingpowershell -Command. Instead, encode the payload using Base64 in Python (usingutf-16leencoding to match PowerShell's[System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode) and decode it within the PowerShell script.β Verification: Ran
python -m compileall src/to verify no syntax errors were introduced. Checkedpytest src/which passed (collected 0 items, meaning no test failures). Added an entry to.jules/sentinel.mdto log the learning.PR created automatically by Jules for task 9911116812668969372 started by @omsingh02