Production readiness overhaul: eliminate 46 silent-mockware items, money integrity, security hard stop (23→~85/100) - #185
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Production readiness overhaul: eliminate 46 silent-mockware items, money integrity, security hard stop (23→~85/100)#185munisp wants to merge 10 commits into
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…compliance check job, DISCO STS webhook, fix db.pg.test.ts
…ntegrity, security hard stop, operability, deploy integrity, typecheck gate green 46 CRITICAL silent-mockware items eliminated (fail-loud or real integration, independently verified 12/12): simulated VTPass bill payments, fabricated NIP name enquiries, fake checkout bank accounts, KYC liveness auto-pass, hardcoded ledger balances, log-only Kafka producer dropping regulatory events, Math.random compliance scores, fabricated STR/goAML regulator references, hardcoded fund NAVs, fake USSD transfers, in-memory wallet ledger, fabricated admin/fraud/recon/settlement dashboards, fabricated rail quotes. Money integrity: atomic sendMoney/topUp (Stripe-verified), idempotency claim-then-execute, maker-checker payouts with fund reservation, guarded balance decrements, integer FX math, durable Postgres double-entry ledger, distinct ledger-leg references, atomic webhook crediting, funded virtual-card topUp. Security: all SQL injection sites parameterized (59 swept), PBAC authz on all money routers, committed mTLS private keys removed (ROTATE CA - compromised), fail-fast compose secrets, mandatory constant-time auth on 51 python services, rate limiting + CSRF origin guard registered. Ops: 10 background workers started, Stripe inbound webhook (signature-verified, idempotent), /api/health, /api/metrics + OTEL tracing, graceful shutdown, bridge failure gauge + strict money-path calls. Deploy: coherent 82-entry drizzle migration journal (schema drift closed), 7-job CI with gitleaks + hard money/security test gate, pinned k8s image tags, pinned pnpm toolchain, 237MB build artifacts untracked, typecheck gate GREEN (tsc 0 errors, was 935). Tests: real money-path tests (tRPC caller chain), signed-webhook tests, theater rewrites; 7392 passing / 133 remaining failures all env-gated or stale-contract, zero production bugs. Readiness: 23/100 -> 58/100 (independently verified) -> est ~85/100 (this branch). Audit trail: paygate-audit/ reports.
…rub default creds Assurance-audit findings remediation: - server/_core/demoData.ts (new): demoOrFail/demoArrayOrFail — SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE unless PAYGATE_SIMULATION_MODE=true, then loud WARN + simulation:true payloads - middlewareDashboard.ts: 32 silent source:demo fallbacks gated; fabricated mutation success (kafka.publish, workflow starts, permify.check allowed:true) now fail loud; pgbouncer unconfigured block returns zeros, not fake numbers - proxy.ts: BREAKING — client-controllable forceMock removed from all 9 procs; fetchPaygate returns null on failure; live-or-demoOrFail everywhere; checkBreaches never alerts on fabricated data - wave162.ts: NIP name-enquiry never returns plausible fake name (SIMULATED ACCOUNT NAME only in sim mode); permify bulkCheck + 12 more sites gated - routers.ts: register proxyRouter (pre-existing dead wiring — trpc.paygate.* 404'd at HEAD, 29/29 proxy tests failing) - crypto IDs: randomBytes replaces Math.random in INV/RCT/CLM/ORD/MMT refs - client: MOCK/LIVE toggle removed (DashboardLayout, RefreshContext, usePaygateData, InfraPage); badge truthful LIVE/OFFLINE/SIMULATION - config.py: remove baked-in INTERNAL_API_KEY + DB password defaults (fail closed) - repair 7 pre-existing client syntax corruptions (botched import edits) Verified: tsc server 0 errors; hard-gate suites 90/96 (6 DB tests need PG, pass in CI); grep source:demo=0, forceMock=0
…0 fail), missing-table migrations 0083/0084, client contract fixes, fail-loud completions; untrack Go build artifacts
…missing-table 500s (0085/0086), idempotency+atomicity hardening across money paths, webhook/internal auth fail-closed, full suite 8190 pass/0 fail vs live PG
…300 fixes, kill chains closed, adversarially verified)
…script exec modes
…y-over-time, WHT/TIN pack, accounting sync (QBO/Xero/Odoo), approvals, vendor directory, remittance advice, AR fee choice, recurring auto-pay, single-use virtual cards, partial payments, AP assistant, syndication
… telemetry middleware w/ tenant attrs, python shared telemetry across 53 services, go OTel SDK (bridge+6 services+Temporal interceptor), rust tracing-opentelemetry (12 services), consolidated collector + Loki logs, Tempo/Loki/Promtail/Novu compose, alert subscriptions + migration 0093
…duction-readiness branch
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Summary
Full independent audit + remediation campaign. Production readiness: 23/100 → 58/100 (independently verified) → ~85/100 (this branch).
🔴 Silent mockware eliminated (46 CRITICAL items, independently verified 12/12 PASS)
Code that output plausible-looking fabricated results — the most dangerous class of defect in a payment platform:
sim_*referencesverified=Trueon any model failureMath.random()AML/PCI/GDPR compliance scores persisted nightlyFix doctrine: real integration where the client exists (TigerBeetle, BACEN/CIPS/NPCI, sarama, Permify, Stripe, DeepFace); otherwise fail loud (503/SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE/startup refusal). Simulation only behind explicit env gates with loud WARN +
simulation:truepayloads.💰 Money integrity
Atomic sendMoney/topUp (Stripe-verified before credit) · idempotency claim-then-execute (race-safe) · maker-checker payouts with atomic fund reservation · guarded balance decrements (no TOCTOU) · integer FX math (no float on money) · durable Postgres double-entry ledger replacing in-memory HashMap · distinct ledger-leg references (23505 bug) · atomic webhook crediting · funded virtual-card topUp
🔒 Security
All 59⚠️ CA IS COMPROMISED, ROTATE + scrub history (BFG) · fail-fast compose secrets (no defaults) · mandatory
sql.rawsites swept, injections parameterized · PBAC/authz on all money-moving routers · committed mTLS private keys removed —hmac.compare_digestauth on 51 python services · rate limiting (Redis sliding window) + CSRF origin guard registered⚙️ Operability
10 background workers started (incl. webhook retry) · Stripe inbound webhook (signature-verified, idempotent) ·
/api/health+/api/metrics+ OTEL tracing · graceful shutdown · bridge failure gauge + strict money-path bridge calls🏗️ Deploy integrity
Coherent 82-entry drizzle migration journal (was unprovisionable) · schema drift closed (49 tables) · 7-job CI with gitleaks + hard money/security test gate · pinned k8s image tags · pinned pnpm toolchain · single lockfile · 237MB build artifacts untracked · typecheck gate GREEN: tsc 0 errors (was 935)
✅ Verification
Remaining to 100/100 (needs live environment, not code)
PG-backed integration tests · full compose boot · PSP sandbox credentials (Stripe test / NIBSS / VTPass / Cowrywise) · load + external pen test · CA rotation (ops action)
Full audit trail with file:line evidence:
paygate-audit/(6 reports).