Let a run consume a predecessor's device result without a host round trip - #2446
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Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change adds caller-owned device-buffer tracking and run-scoped borrows across the runtime and chip-run lane. Host graph access defers reads or writes when another live run holds the span, and worker free paths reject in-flight references. Tests cover buffer bookkeeping, run admission, access deferral, and a chained device-result run. ChangesCaller Buffer and Run Access Flow
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant RunSubmitter
participant ChipRunLane
participant ChipWorker
participant RuntimeCAPI
participant DeviceRunnerBase
participant HostTensorAccessor
RunSubmitter->>ChipRunLane: submit run with device spans
ChipRunLane->>ChipWorker: borrow spans for run identity
ChipWorker->>RuntimeCAPI: call device_borrow_caller_buffers_ctx
RuntimeCAPI->>DeviceRunnerBase: register borrow
DeviceRunnerBase-->>ChipRunLane: return borrow result
HostTensorAccessor->>RuntimeCAPI: query whether another run holds span
RuntimeCAPI->>DeviceRunnerBase: check caller-buffer borrow
DeviceRunnerBase-->>HostTensorAccessor: return held status
HostTensorAccessor-->>RunSubmitter: refuse access and latch deferral
Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to This change lets chained runs share device buffers, but three problems remain. Freeing through the older device-free entry skips the new in-use protection, so a buffer can be released while a run still uses it. A run whose graph build reads a buffer still being produced fails instead of retrying, as the change describes. Calling free from inside a graph callback hangs submission. Fix all three before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 23.74% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 139 functions across 21 files. (3 skipped: 2 unsupported, 1 too large.)
✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1🛠️ Fix failing CI checks 💡
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Actionable comments posted: 3
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In `@python/simpler/worker.py`:
- Line 11122: Update `_refuse_free_while_in_flight()` so a callback running on
this worker skips reacquiring `_submit_mu`, avoiding deadlock with
`_submit_locked()`. Keep the accepted-handle identity scan and
`_hierarchical_start_cv` guard unchanged.
In `@src/a2a3/runtime/host_build_graph/host/runtime_maker.cpp`:
- Around line 1448-1456: Update the tensor_access_deferred branch to return the
prepared-run-incompatible status so the caller retries preparation at depth one
instead of terminalizing the successor. In cleanup_failed_prepare, preserve that
status rather than replacing it with a cleanup status.
In `@src/common/platform/onboard/host/c_api_shared.cpp`:
- Line 531: Update both device_free_ctx implementations to call
free_caller_buffer instead of free_tensor: make this change in
src/common/platform/onboard/host/c_api_shared.cpp at line 531 and
src/common/platform/sim/host/c_api_shared.cpp at line 460. Use DeviceRunnerBase
and SimDeviceRunnerBase, respectively.
After applying the fix, consider running `coderabbit review --agent` for local
review. Visit https://docs.coderabbit.ai/cli?utm_source=ghpr
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📒 Files selected for processing (24)
python/simpler/worker.pysrc/a2a3/runtime/host_build_graph/host/runtime_maker.cppsrc/common/host_build_graph/host/host_tensor_access.cppsrc/common/host_build_graph/host_tensor_access.hsrc/common/platform/include/common/host_api.hsrc/common/platform/include/host/caller_device_buffers.hsrc/common/platform/onboard/host/c_api_shared.cppsrc/common/platform/onboard/host/device_runner_base.cppsrc/common/platform/onboard/host/device_runner_base.hsrc/common/platform/sim/host/c_api_shared.cppsrc/common/platform/sim/host/device_runner_base.cppsrc/common/platform/sim/host/device_runner_base.hsrc/common/worker/chip_run_lane.cppsrc/common/worker/chip_worker.cppsrc/common/worker/chip_worker.hsrc/common/worker/runtime_c_api.htests/st/a2a3/host_build_graph/early_enqueue/test_early_enqueue.pytests/ut/cpp/common/hierarchical/test_chip_run_lane_joined_launch.cpptests/ut/cpp/common/host_build_graph/CMakeLists.txttests/ut/cpp/common/host_build_graph/test_host_tensor_access_deferral.cpptests/ut/cpp/common/platform/CMakeLists.txttests/ut/cpp/common/platform/test_caller_device_buffers.cpptests/ut/cpp/support/pipeline_contract_runtime.cpptests/ut/py/test_chip_worker.py
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ReviewReviewed at 0. SummaryA successor could not name a predecessor's device output, so chaining runs meant a host round trip. This PR admits a device address by giving the run a borrow on the caller allocation containing it, and refuses a host read of bytes another live run has declared it produces. The core is sound and the correctness reasoning is careful — I verified the identity invariant, every discharge path, and all three concurrency mechanisms. Residual: one fence boundary that is narrower than the narrative implies, one design-level concern about how the "wait" intent is signalled, and the fact that nothing in the diff was executed on this head. Needs discussion, not blocked. 1. Scope: this is an L2-internal changeWorth stating up front, because
Those 58 lines are So "caller" in 2. The mechanism, in three sentences
Host-space tensors do not participate, for two independent reasons. They are copied into a The things I checked rather than took on trust:
3. Goal ↔ implementation
Stated and real goal match; the one behavioural change to an existing path ( 4. FindingsD1 — design: the "wait" intent has no channel of its own (please discuss before merge)The accessor can only fail an access; it cannot say why. So the intent is carried by three parallel pieces of state and four layers of translation: Each of the three is individually correct — I checked the semantics, the memory ordering and the races, and the round-6/7 reasoning about why neither a pre-exchange load nor the latched code can substitute for CAS ownership is right. The concern is structural: three of the seven rounds in the body are corrections to this one channel (missing short-circuit laundering an unrelated failure into a retry; The question I would like answered: why not a three-state return from S1 — the fence is exactly as wide as the declaration, and the declaration has two silent holes
Separately, Failure example: a run whose OUT device tensor does not resolve (an address from another allocator, or a signature that omits or mislabels the output) is launched as the front and declares nothing; its successor is concurrently prepared, its host build reads that buffer, Not a regression — this is the pre-existing concurrent-prepare read hole, now closed on the main path and left open at the edges. But it is the feature's own safety argument, and the a2a3 residue is undocumented while the a5 one is. Minimum: have S2 — two headers promise a return value the code cannot produce
S3 — an unreachable state is documented as reachable
Consider
Context worth recording, not a defectThe host-space analogue of this problem exists and is unfenced. If a caller chains through a host buffer — A's OUT and B's IN are the same host 5. RecommendationProblem is real, the method solves it, the implementation matches the claims, and I found no correctness defect I can demonstrate. Needs discussion on three points, in this order:
On size: Core churn is 1364 lines (total 2887), past the point where a PR can be held in head in one pass, and it is a single commit, so there is no commit-level reading order. I would not ask for a retroactive split of finished work, but the seven rounds the body narrates are exactly the structure that would have made this reviewable. Change breakdown and pto-isa pinTest churn slightly exceeds core churn, which is the healthy ratio. Nothing in Uncategorized. Only 27 deletions, all this branch's own. Docs: zero — defensible, since the design lives in the new header's 75-line preamble, but a capability this size leaves no trace under pto-isa pin (advisory): No external reviewer CLIs were run; every claim above is checked against the code at |
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Thank you — this found two false documentation promises, one real asymmetry in the fence's own guard, and a design question I had not answered honestly. Everything below is in D1 — the three-piece channel: no ABI excuse, and what a typed return would actually buyYou offered me an out and I should not take it: there is no ABI constraint. What it buys is exactly one of the three pieces: the thread-local goes away, and the reason becomes per-access and per-thread by construction rather than by a reset-on-entry discipline. It does not remove the other two, and this is now written into
So the honest shape is 3 → 2, not 3 → 0. I have not taken it in this head: the signature change ripples into the two accessor suites, and this round is not permitted to re-execute them, so shipping it blind would be worse than recording it. It is written up as a bounded follow-up with the decision left explicit. Your underlying point — three of seven rounds were corrections to this one channel — I accept as the cost it is, not as a stylistic note. S1 — you are right, and the fence now says how wide it isBoth holes are real. Audit of the supported paths: Unresolvable produced span. I did not turn it into a bind failure. The approved contract keeps a device pointer whose owner cannot be proven on the existing serial path rather than rejecting the run; failing the bind here would break exactly that, so the gap is reported instead of resolved. Signature coverage. Confirmed as you describe: Also fixed: Recorded in Scope beside the a5 gap, with your framing: these are the pre-existing concurrent-prepare exposure narrowed to what can be proven, not closed everywhere. No protection is claimed beyond the declarations. S2 — false promise removedConfirmed: S3 — mandatory ABI, documented as suchConfirmed: Consider list
Your §1 scope table, the host-space analogue, and the identity/discharge/ Two clarificationsWhat the borrow tracks: only Fixed slots stay: CIYour statement was accurate at On size and the single commit: agreed, and no defence offered. |
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Follow-up at R1 — the counterexample, closed in two placesYour sequence is the one that matters: A writes a An uncovered DEVICE argument is refused upstream. An unprovable-owner run carries no concurrent preparation. Nothing else moved: no IN allocation is marked produced, no global inference, no ownership over external pointers, and no claim that a serial launch protects an earlier preparation — the guard is on preparation. New cases, first execution, recorded exactly
Nothing previously executed was re-run. R2 — invariants only in sourceRemoved: the D1 alternatives discussion from The no-rerun rule is not used as a design reason anywhere. D1 remains explicitly separate: a typed three-state return removes the thread-local and neither the run-scoped cause ( |
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Head Ledger correction first. My previous report claimed nothing previously executed was re-run. That was wrong. The retirement window, as it actually stands at this head. The repair, test-only. On the caution about using a flush as a success assertion on a partial run — checked rather than assumed: This was the only site reading those counts on the writer's schedule. Of the three other assertions that a slot came back, two already sit behind this same barrier and the third follows an explicit reader join. The collector, its ordering and every other workstream's source are untouched. Verification. Compiled all four targets the file builds into — |
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…trip A successor could not name a predecessor's output buffer. The lane refused every device-space tensor for a joined launch, and its comment said why: a host tensor is copied into staging the run owns for its whole lifetime, while a device address belongs to the caller and outlives nothing in particular. So a chain of runs had to route each intermediate back through the host, or wait. This makes a device address admissible by giving the run a reference on it. `A(x) -> y -> B(y) -> z -> C(z)` now runs with `y` and `z` staying on the device: each successor is handed an address and a layout, its work reaches the device while its predecessor is still executing, and the device still runs one whole operator at a time. The caller keeps the right to allocate and release throughout. What is new is that a release is refused while a run may still reach those bytes. ## Who owns a caller device buffer, and who may borrow it The device context that minted an allocation records it. Only the caller-facing mint records, so a region this context allocated for itself — a workspace bank, a retained temporary, an arena — is absent from the table and therefore not nameable by a run's arguments. That refusal needs no list of exclusions: it is the absence. A run's borrow is over the *allocation containing* each span it names, because a tensor may sit at an offset inside a larger buffer and release is per allocation. It answers only whether the allocation may be released; whether its bytes may be read on the host is a separate fact, below. It is taken at lane admission, before anything can prepare or launch, and inside admission's own unwind: taking it allocates, so a failure removes the queued entry, gives back only what was acquired, leaves the run ahead untouched, and reports the run's own error. Recording a fresh allocation allocates too, so a failure there rolls the device memory back rather than handing the caller nothing while the pages stay committed to no one. The borrow is keyed on the pipeline slot, which holds one run for that run's whole lifetime. That is also an identity the runtime can name, which the host read below needs. A span that resolves to no caller allocation of this context takes no borrow, and a run holding no borrow for a device tensor it names is not joinable — it takes the serial path it takes today. The check that refused every device tensor is replaced by a stronger one, not removed. ## What retirement discharges, and what it cannot Every retired run is discharged once, by identity, and that discharges both facts it could have established: the borrow over the allocations its arguments name, and the declaration of which of them it produces. Both, because a run can have either without the other — an all-or-nothing borrow may have been refused while a declaration over one resolved span stood — and because the next run to occupy that slot inherits the identity and must inherit neither the permissions nor the debts of the one before it. So the discharge runs for every admitted run rather than only for one that borrowed. A run that threw during admission established nothing and is not discharged. The point of discharge is the return of that run's finalize: the call that drains its device work, copies its outputs back and releases its bindings, and so the point at which the last consumer of a borrowed address is done. A finalize that *failed* discharges neither fact, and the two consequences are different. The allocation may never be released, because the device may still name those bytes. And the bytes this run had declared may never be read on the host, because nothing can now establish that the write completed — serving them would serve a value mid-write. Both marks sit on the allocation rather than on the run, since the run is gone and its identity is handed on. What teardown then does with such an allocation is decided where those outcomes are known; the table is not teardown's authority. Holding is not producing, and that stays true here: a retained borrow over an allocation nobody declared leaves its bytes readable. ## Two halves of one refusal `Worker.release_buffer` already refuses while an in-flight run names a host backing. `Worker.free` did not, and a device allocation is the one an early-enqueued successor can still hold long after its predecessor finished. It now runs the same three scans. `_submit_mu` keeps that scan from landing mid-callback with a half-populated touched set, but the submit path holds it for the whole graph callback and it is not reentrant — so an `orch.free` inside a callback would take it twice and block forever. It is not re-acquired when this thread is already inside one of this Worker's own callbacks, where the serialization it provides already holds. From any other thread, and for a frame belonging to another Worker, it is taken as before; the scan itself is unchanged. The chip child refuses independently, and that one is authoritative: it owns the address space and knows when the last consumer finished. Its check and its release are one step inside the device context, so a borrow taken between a caller's question and its release cannot be missed. ## A host build that needs an unfinished result waits for it host_build_graph runs its orchestrator on the host, and a device tensor's region resolves on first access. So an orchestration that reads a device input's bytes while building its graph would read whatever is there — which, for a buffer a live run is still producing, is nothing it should act on. That access is refused: no unproduced value enters a graph, and no host mapping of a buffer under active device writes is installed. The refusal reaches the orchestrator as a failed access, which latches a fatal and stops the run, and the accessor's latch is what lets the failure name its cause instead of arriving as a bare invalid-argument. An address no region covers never reaches that latch, so a genuinely bad address stays one. The question asked is whether a run has **declared that it produces** those bytes, not whether another run holds the allocation. Holding is not producing: two runs may take one immutable device input, and neither may be told the other's bytes are unreadable. A prepared successor is gated only by concurrent-prepare support, which every runtime answers, so a hold-based question would have turned that legal pattern into a fatal on a5, on both tensormap runtimes, and at the default depth. The direction is not available where the lane sees the arguments, but it is where the runtime binds: the orchestration signature. So a bind declares which caller spans it produces before it runs its orchestration, which is the window in which a concurrently preparing run's build can ask. A successor is only prepared while its predecessor is launched, hence already bound, so the declaration is in place by then. A declaration the platform could not record is never reported as made: the bind fails there, before the orchestration it would have gated and before anything of this run's is published, because an unrecorded producer reads to every other run as a buffer with no producer at all. The refusal is what makes that safe, not the state left behind — the previous declaration stays, and it may name entirely different spans. The fence is exactly as wide as what was declared, so what cannot be declared does not get a successor prepared beside it. Two ways a produced span has no declaration, and each is closed where it arises: A device argument the callable's signature does not cover is refused. Direction is the only thing such an argument's handling turns on — it is passed through by address, never copied either way — so an uncovered index is an argument list the callable does not describe, and neither answer about it is available: declaring it would refuse a legal shared read, leaving it undeclared would serve unproduced bytes. An address this context cannot resolve to a caller mint keeps its run off the concurrent path entirely. A run holding no borrow over every device span it names proved no span to declare, so it now carries no successor *preparation* either, not just no joined launch — its successor prepares at the front, after it retires, which is the serial behaviour such a program had before device arguments could be enqueued early. That is the same condition the launch already applied, moved to the earlier boundary, because the successor's own graph build is what reads those bytes. The run itself is not failed for needing the value. Its bind reports the status the lane already answers by leaving a successor queued: it keeps its slot, its borrow and its declaration, nothing of the run ahead is touched, and it prepares again once it reaches the front — which is after the producer retired and its declaration was discharged. The build therefore waits for the value it needs, which is the behaviour the same program had before a device argument could be enqueued early. A cleanup that cannot complete still takes precedence over that status and fails the run, which is exactly the grading cleanup_failed_prepare already applies to the other reason a successor is pushed back to depth one. That answer is only right for a run whose *own* reason for stopping was the wait, so the run's cause is published once, by the one access entitled to publish it. `get_tensor_data` and `set_tensor_data` short-circuit after a fatal, as every other orchestration entry already did, so an orchestration that failed for a reason of its own never reaches an access. An access that is refused carries its reason per access and per thread — a dependency wait, or an address no region covers — and publishes the run's cause only when its own fatal report is the call that latched the field. The orchestrator's report returns whether this caller's exchange won it; nothing weaker establishes that, since the reporters are not one thread, a load before the report can be overtaken, and an independent failure may carry the very code a refused access reports. Publication is one-shot and nothing withdraws it. So a losing reporter neither claims the run nor clears what another access established: an unrelated failure keeps the run — nothing guarantees a stateful callback raises it again — and two refusals waiting on the same predecessor still leave the run waiting, rather than failing a valid program on which thread reported first. ## What this does not change The device executes one whole operator at a time, ordered by the same queued event wait. No latency or occupancy figure is claimed. There is no new tensor dependency tracking: the caller's own argument lists are the dependency contract, and the FIFO is what orders them. The pipeline depth is unchanged at two, so a chain longer than two runs is sustained refill through retirement rather than more concurrency. Only a2a3 host_build_graph answers that it can order two runs, so the joined launch is confined there. Concurrent preparation is not, which is why the host-read refusal keys on a declaration only that runtime's bind makes rather than on the presence of another live run. ## Interfaces Three entries join the existing `device_*_ctx` family — a guarded release, and the borrow and its discharge — and two join the `HostApi` ops table: the write declaration and the readability query. Both are null-guarded, so a platform publishing neither behaves exactly as it did. The declaration reports whether it was recorded, since its caller cannot proceed without it. `device_malloc_ctx` becomes the recording mint, and the legacy `device_free_ctx` routes through the same guarded release so it can neither bypass the in-use check nor leave the table naming freed pages. Both doubles that enumerate this ABI export the three: the cpput loader fixture and the Python chip-worker test's own DSO export set. The second is a separate list, and missing it left every case in that class failing at dlsym before the boundary it was written to test. ## A retirement assertion that waits for the retirement `ChipSwimlaneRetainedRunsTest.RunWithoutTerminalStillPublishesAndReleasesItsSlot` read the collector's slot counts as soon as its artifact appeared. Publication is the earlier of the two steps: the writer links the file, then records the verdict, retires the cut and only then hands the slot back, so the file's existence never proved the release and the case could find the slot still occupied. It now waits on the collector's own flush barrier, which returns once no closed epoch holds a slot, and a cut-unknown run leaves a readable artifact so that barrier reports no failure. The artifact, content, slot and fatal-state assertions are unchanged, and the collector itself is untouched. ## The lint hook configures the tree it lints `tests/lint/clang_tidy.py` recovers a broken per-target compile database by rerunning that target's CMake configure, and which source tree it points CMake at comes from the `PROJECT_ROOT` of the `simpler_setup` it imports. The hook runs as a script, so the repo root is not on its path and a wheel install of this project answers that import — its root being the second copy of `src/` under `simpler_setup/_assets`. The database that comes back then names platform sources under paths no changed file can match, and compiles this tree's own sources with both copies of `src/common` on the include path, where `#pragma once` is per file: every shared type arrives twice and reads as a redefinition of itself. The import now takes the repo root first, and refuses to configure anything if `simpler_setup` still reports a different root. `simpler_setup/build_runtimes.py` already bootstraps its path the same way for the same reason, which is why the databases an install writes are rooted in the checkout and only a recovered one was mixed. A rewritten database is also published by rename rather than written in place. Every invocation of the hook reads all of them and pre-commit runs this hook as several processes over chunks of the file list, so a truncating write is observable by a peer as an empty database — which reads as a broken cache and sends that peer into a reconfigure of its own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Head What the log shows. 14 Where the second copy comes from. The recovery reruns a target's CMake configure, and which tree it points CMake at is decided by the Reproduced, with before/after. A copied wheel tree (
One of CI's three failing TUs reproduces locally; the other two differ only in which header each reaches through both roots. The mechanism is proved by the include list rather than by the count. A silent second consequence. With the installed copy supplying the platform entries, the changed The fix. The trigger is a separate question and I have not settled it. Every target is configured with Residual, stated not fixed: two concurrent invocations can still both decide a database is broken and both reconfigure the same target directory; that needs a lock file, which is more than this correction. Verification. The hook over the changed sources: rc=0. |
Summary
A successor could not name a predecessor's device output.
chip_run_lane.cpp'sjoinable_shaperefused every device-space tensor for a joined launch, and its comment said why: a host tensor is copied into staging the run owns for its whole lifetime, while a device address belongs to the caller and outlives nothing in particular. So chaining runs meant routing each intermediate back through the host, or waiting.This makes a device address admissible by giving the run a reference on it.
A(x) -> y -> B(y) -> z -> C(z)now runs withyandzstaying on the device: each successor is handed an address and a layout, its work reaches the device while its predecessor is still executing, and the device still runs one whole operator at a time.The caller keeps the right to allocate and release throughout. What is new is that a release is refused while a run may still reach those bytes.
No latency or occupancy figure is claimed.
Ownership: who owns a caller device buffer, and who borrows it
CallerDeviceBuffers(src/common/platform/include/host/caller_device_buffers.h) lives on the device context — the object that already owns the allocator, the free path and the child-memory host-view cache.Worker.malloc/alloc_child_tensor/Worker.free, unchangedfinalize_native_runreturns — the call that drains its device work, copies its outputs back and releases its bindingsA span resolving to no caller allocation of this context takes no borrow, and a run holding no borrow for a device tensor it names is not joinable — it takes the serial path it takes today. The check that refused every device tensor is replaced by a stronger one, not removed.
Two halves of one refusal
Worker.release_bufferalready refuses while an in-flight run names a host backing.Worker.freedid not, and a device allocation is the one an early-enqueued successor can still hold long after its predecessor finished. It now runs the same three scans, including the abandoned-run rule._submit_muis what keeps that scan from landing mid-callback with a half-populated touched set — but_submit_lockedholds it for the whole graph callback and it is not reentrant, so anorch.freeinside a callback would take it twice and deadlock, with the submitter alive andclosewaiting. It is therefore not re-acquired when_callback_frame_for(self)shows this thread is already inside one of this Worker's own callbacks, where the serialization it provides already holds. From any other thread, and for a frame belonging to another Worker, it is taken as before. The scan itself is unchanged, so a buffer an in-flight run already dispatched is still refused from inside a callback.The chip child refuses independently, and that one is authoritative: it owns the address space and knows when the last consumer finished. Its check and its release are one step inside the device context, so a borrow taken between a caller's question and its release cannot be missed.
A host build that needs an unfinished result waits for it
host_build_graph runs its orchestrator on the host, and a device tensor's region resolves on first access (
host_tensor_access.h). An orchestration that reads a device input's bytes while building its graph would read whatever is there — which, for a buffer a live run is still producing, is nothing it should act on.That access is refused: no unproduced value enters a graph, and no host mapping of a buffer under active device writes is installed. The refusal reaches the orchestrator as a failed access, which latches a fatal and stops the run, and the accessor's latch is what lets the failure name its cause rather than arrive as a bare invalid-argument. An address no region covers never reaches the latch, so a genuinely bad address stays a bad address.
Producing, not merely holding. An earlier revision asked whether any other live run held the allocation, on the grounds that
ChipStorageTaskArgscarries no direction. That was wrong in a way worth spelling out, because it reached far outside this capability: a prepared successor is gated bypermits_native_successor, which askssupports_concurrent_native_prepareand nothing about launch depth — and all four runtimes answer 1. So two runs sharing one immutable device input, on a5 HBG or either TMR or a2a3 at default depth one, would have had a legal host read turned into a fatal.The direction is available, just not to the lane: the runtime's own bind receives the orchestration signature. So the a2a3 HBG bind now declares which caller spans it produces, before it runs its orchestration — which is the window in which a concurrently preparing run's build can ask. The ordering holds by construction, since a successor is only prepared while its predecessor is LAUNCHED, hence already bound. Two runs sharing a read-only input declare nothing and both read it.
That makes the fence real rather than assumed: a5 HBG and both TMRs never declare, so their query always answers false and no refusal can fire there.
The run is not failed for needing the value — it waits. The bind returns
PTO_RUNTIME_ERR_PREPARED_INCOMPATIBLE, the status the lane already answers by leaving a successor queued:prepare_successor_if_eligiblecatchesPreparedRunIncompatible, setsdepth_one_fallback, and the run keeps its slot, its borrow and its declaration while nothing of the live predecessor is touched. It prepares again when it reaches the front — after the producer retired and its declaration was discharged — so the build gets the value it needs. That is the behaviour the same program had before a device argument could be enqueued early, which is what makes it the right answer rather than a retry bolted on: at default depth one the lane already prepares a successor concurrently, so this shape could reach the refusal there too, and a hard error would have been a regression for a program that used to work.A previous revision withdrew this conversion, arguing that
cleanup_failed_prepareendsif (validation_rc != 0) return validation_rc; if (resources_rc != 0) return resources_rc; return execution_rc;and so only returns the deferral when the aborted orchestration's cleanup is perfectly clean. The ordering is real, but the conclusion was wrong twice over: that grading is correct — a cleanup that could not complete is a hard failure and must not be laundered into a retry — and it is the same grading the existing depth-one fallback from the arena-compatibility probe already goes through. So the deferral is graded, not guaranteed: clean cleanup yields the wait, a failing cleanup yields that failure. The round-3 bind cases show the cleanup on this path (release_run_bindings_impl) returning 0.One hardware run from round 2 remains unexplained and is not claimed otherwise: the successor's prepare reported
-1000(the cleanup status) and the predecessor the device's own-100. That case was deleted and its evidence is retained below; I did not isolate its cause, and this revision does not claim to have fixed it.A declaration that cannot be recorded fails the bind. The statement is never reported as made, because an unrecorded producer reads to every other run as a buffer with no producer at all — the one answer that lets a build consume bytes this run has not written. The failure is raised before the orchestration it gates and before anything of this run's is published, and that refusal is what makes it safe: the previous declaration stays behind, but it may name entirely different spans, so it is no substitute for the one that failed.
The wait is only offered to a run whose own reason for stopping was the wait, and that cause is published once.
get_tensor_data/set_tensor_datashort-circuit once a fatal is latched, which is what every other orchestration entry (submit_task,alloc_tensors,begin_scope, …) already did and these two did not; so an orchestration that failed for a reason of its own never reaches an access. An access that is refused carries its reason per access and per thread — a dependency wait, or an address no region covers — and publishes the run's cause only when its own fatal report is the call that latched the field.OrchestratorState::report_fatal_ownedreturns whether this caller's compare-exchange won.Publication is one-shot, and nothing withdraws it. That closes both directions:
Nothing weaker establishes ownership. The reporters are not one thread — a recording worker, the bind thread and
TaskAllocatorall write that field — so any load taken before the report can be overtaken; and the latched code cannot stand in for it, because an independent failure may carry the veryINVALID_ARGSa refused access reports. Why it matters: a run's own failure must never be converted into a retry, since nothing guarantees a stateful callback raises it again on the second attempt.Scope
Only a2a3 host_build_graph answers that it can order two runs (
joined_native_launch_supported_impl), so the joined launch is confined there. Concurrent preparation is not — every runtime answerssupports_concurrent_native_prepare— which is why the host-read refusal is keyed on a declaration only the a2a3 HBG bind makes rather than on the presence of another live run.Known and pre-existing, not fixed here: a5 HBG's own host build could read a device output a concurrently-preparing predecessor is writing, and would read unproduced bytes. That is its behaviour today; a5 is out of scope and its maker belongs to another worktree, so it is recorded rather than changed.
PTO_PIPELINE_MAX_DEPTHstays 2, so a chain longer than two runs is sustained refill through retirement, not more concurrency. Not here: TMR, a5, cross-endpoint, group/SUB, comm, capture/replay, caller-stream unification, any global tensor dependency tracker, any newPTO_/PTO2identifier.Interfaces
Three entries join the existing
device_*_ctxfamily — a guarded release, the borrow, and its discharge — and two join theHostApiops table: the write declaration and the readability query, both null-guarded likeacquire_child_memory_host_view, so a platform publishing neither behaves exactly as it did. The declaration returns a status rather than nothing, because its caller cannot proceed without it; a platform that publishes no declaration entry answers "nothing to record", which is the same behaviour that platform had.device_malloc_ctxbecomes the recording mint. The legacydevice_free_ctxnow routes through the same guarded release, so it can neither bypass the in-use check nor leave the table holding an address whose pages are gone; it returns void, so a refusal is logged rather than reported, anddevice_free_caller_buffer_ctxstays the entry that reports it.Both doubles that enumerate this ABI export the three: the cpput loader fixture and
tests/ut/py/test_chip_worker.py's own DSO export set. Missing the second is what reddened eightTestChipWorkerKernelSymbolscases on3ec713716— they failed atdlsym failed for 'device_free_caller_buffer_ctx'before reaching the boundary each was written to test.Execution ledger
One first execution per genuinely new case, exact filters. Nothing already executed was re-run — not the 11 original table cases, not the onboard chain case, and not the deleted onboard case under any name.
test_caller_device_buffers, 11 original casesTestDeviceResultChainonboard chaintest_{a2a3,a5}_hbg_host_tensor_access_deferral, 8 cases × 2 buildsChipRunLaneCallerBuffersTest.*, 4 casesTestDeviceControlDataWaitsonboardtests/ut/py/test_worker/test_device_free_refusal.py, 8 casesHbgHostAccessContractTest× 6 new, on the realbind_callable_to_runtime_implCallerDeviceBuffers× 5 newARetainedBorrowIsNotEvidenceThatARunIsStillProducing, whose asserted contract was wrong — see belowCallerDeviceBuffers.AProvenReleaseDischargesTheBorrowAndTheDeclarationHbgHostAccessContractTest.ADeclarationThatCannotBeRecordedFailsTheBind, a2a3 and a5 buildsTestDeviceResultChain::test_a_device_result_feeds_the_next_two_runs, a3 boardaabb80313(job 107302632311, 4.5 s,devices=[4]) — not a local run of mineHbgHostAccessContractTest.AnEarlierIndependentFatalIsNotReplacedByADeferredRead, a2a3 and a5 buildsHbgHostAccessContractTest.ARefusalThatDidNotLatchTheFatalDoesNotClaimTheRun, a2a3 and a5 buildsHbgHostAccessContractTest.ARefusalThatLosesToAnotherRefusalStillLeavesTheRunWaiting, a2a3 and a5 buildsNot run in rounds 4–7, and therefore unverified locally: every case those rounds modified. That includes the a5 bind cases, the two lane cases whose release expectations changed, the table cases whose contract changed,
ReadingADeclaredProducersDeviceOutputDefersTheBindwith its per-target branch, and all eightHostTensorAccessDeferralcases, which round 7 re-expressed against the accessor's new split (per-access reason vs published cause) — re-running an already-executed case, including a failed one under a new name, is outside these rounds' authorization. Their correctness here is static reasoning plus a clean build; CI is their first execution. The fake readability query also gained two optional hooks, which the cases that do not set them cannot observe.The chain scene has a passing witness, and it is CI's, at an earlier head. The a3 board job at
aabb80313passedtest_a_device_result_feeds_the_next_two_runs: three DEVICE-linkedWorker.submitcalls, the intermediate values, the early-enqueue/FIFO evidence, the third run's refill, and the free refusal followed by a clean release. I did not run it and have not re-run it. The heads since change only how a failed bind is graded, add a post-fatal short-circuit on two accessors, and take failure ownership from the fatal exchange — none of which the healthy scene path reaches — but the witness stands ataabb80313, not at this head.The round-1 local failure of that same case remains historical evidence. It established the free refusal, the three correct device results (
y = 4.25,z = 6.5,w = 8.75), the frees succeeding afterwards, and two joined-launch records (observed=1 unfired=1 rc=0) chaining(dispatch 1, slot 0) -> (dispatch 2, slot 1) -> (dispatch 3, slot 0), while failing overall because_CaseRunswas never sampled so the pair filter admitted nothing. The sampler was added; the local run was never repeated.Retained failed evidence. The deleted
TestDeviceControlDataWaitsfailed with the successor's prepare returning-1000fromcleanup_failed_prepare's cleanup status and the predecessor reporting the device's own-100(completed_tasks=1, total_tasks=513,TIMEOUT_EXIT, cores blocked). Deleting the case does not erase that: I did not isolate whether the late-failing cleanup beside a live predecessor caused the stall, and I do not claim it is benign.The one failing lane case asserted
std::runtime_errorwhere admission correctly propagates the originalstd::bad_allocfrom the handle — the unwind worked and my expected type was wrong. Corrected toEXPECT_ANY_THROWand not re-run, so the post-conditions after that line are unverified.What round 3's six bind cases do and do not establish. They drive the production chain end to end —
get_tensor_data→report_fatal→ the orchestrator's latch → the bind's status →release_run_bindings_implreturning 0 — on a fake HostApi table with no device. They establish that path's behaviour and the R2 regression guard (a shared read-only device input stays readable). They do not establish anything about a real device, a real concurrent predecessor, or the onboard scene.Round 4: the three concrete defects those cases and CI exposed
A normal retirement left the declaration standing.
releaseerasedwrites_only on the branch where no borrow existed, so the production sequence — borrow, declare, release — dropped the reference and kept the write declaration. A later run reading that completed producer's output was then refused for the rest of the process.ChipRunLane::release_device_spanscompounded it by returning early unless a borrow had been taken, which made the no-borrow erasure unreachable through the real lane. Now the discharge covers both facts and runs for every admitted run, and akeepdischarge marks both on the allocation instead of dropping either.The cost of that fix is that the two marks now live on the allocation rather than in per-identity sets, which is also what makes them survive slot reuse — and makes
releaseallocation-free, so it cannot throw on anoexceptteardown path.A failed declaration silently removed the protection it was supposed to add. Both platform callbacks allocated a conversion vector and caught everything with no result, while the HostApi wrapper returned void and the bind continued into orchestration regardless. A first-declaration OOM therefore let a producer run with no entry, and a successor's host read would have answered "readable" over bytes nobody had written. The op now returns a status, the wrapper reports it, and the bind fails there.
One asserted contract was wrong, and CI was right to fail it.
ARetainedBorrowIsNotEvidenceThatARunIsStillProducingclaimed that a run which declared a write and then could not prove its consumer finished leaves its bytes readable, reasoning that one teardown failure should not make a buffer permanently unreadable. That is a convenience argument, not a safety one: an unproven consumer may still be mid-write, and the allocation is already permanently unreleasable for the same reason. The case is replaced byAnUnprovenProducersBytesStayUnreadableForGoodwith the inverse assertion, plusARetainedBorrowWithNoDeclarationLeavesTheBytesReadablefor the half that genuinely does stay readable — holding is still not producing.The a5 CI failures were the fixture's fault, not a5's. Three cases asserted
declare_calls == 1against a maker that intentionally declares nothing, and the firstASSERT_to fail returned before the manualrelease_run_bindings_implat the end of the body — leaking that run's bindings into the fake platform, whose next case then hit a free withlive.count == 0. Both halves are fixed without touching a5: every one of these cases now takes the surrounding suite'scleanup_runtime(runtime)RAII guard, so an assertion exit still releases, and the declaration assertions branch on a per-target compile definition that says which maker is linked — asserting on a5 that nothing is published, rather than skipping.Round 5: the two defects CI and review found in that round
F1 — one more universal a5 expectation.
ReadingADeclaredProducersDeviceOutputDefersTheBindstill expectedPREPARED_INCOMPATIBLEon every target. The refusal itself is the shared accessor's, so it does fire on the a5 build — but that maker neither declares a producer nor reads the deferral mark, so its run ends with the fatal the refused access latched,runtime_status_from_error_code(SIMPLER_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS). The case now asserts that branch by the same per-target contract the other three use, and asserts the shared halves (the query fired, the read returned nothing, the latch is the accessor's) on both. No a5 production behaviour was touched, and the case is not skipped anywhere.F2 — a deferred read could speak for an orchestration that had already failed for its own reason. The path is real and was mine:
report_fatalonly latches and returns;get_tensor_datadid not short-circuit on an existing fatal; so a callback that reported a genuine failure and then read a declared producer's output left the deferral mark set, whileorch_mark_fatal's first-error-wins kept the original code.run_host_orchestrationreturned that original error correctly — and the bind discarded it and asked the lane for a retry. A stateful callback need not raise the same failure on the second attempt, so the original error could be lost outright.Fixed where the two facts meet.
get_tensor_dataandset_tensor_datanow short-circuit once a fatal is latched, which is whatsubmit_task,alloc_tensors,begin_scopeandend_scopehave always done and these two alone did not — so a failed orchestration never reaches an access and leaves no mark. The new regression pins that withquery_calls == 0: the accessor is not reached at all. Comparing codes was never an option, which is why one arm uses an independent failure carrying the sameINVALID_ARGSa refusal reports.Documentation. The
declare_writescomment claimed a failed replacement's previous declaration "refuses at least as much as the new one would". Disjoint spans falsify that; the comment now states the invariant that actually holds — the bind is rejected before publication, so nothing of that run reaches the device for another run to read.Round 6: ownership of the failure, taken from the exchange
The round-5 fix covered the sequential case and left a real hole one step later, which review found: the refusal's second
is_fatal()load and itsreport_fatalare separate operations. A recording worker can win the field between them, andreport_fatalreturns void — so the losing caller never learned it lost, left the mark set, and the bind converted an unrelated failure into a retry. An extra load could not close that, and the latched code could not either, since both reporters may carryINVALID_ARGS.Ownership now comes from the compare-exchange itself.
orch_mark_fatalgained an owned-flag variant (its six existing callers and its logging are untouched),orch_report_fatal_vreturns whether this report latched the field, andOrchestratorState::report_fatal_ownedexposes that to the two accessor entries: a refusal that did not latch the field withdraws its mark, and the run keeps the failure that did. Nothing else aboutreport_fatal, its callers, or its log lines changed, and no op joinedRuntimeOps.Two further honesty items. The published cause is
std::atomic<bool>: the access that sets it can run on a recording worker while the bind reads it afterwards, so the plainboolI had introduced was a data race. And the header stopped claiming that two loads covered every racing reporter.The regression drives that boundary deterministically: the fake readability query latches a competing fatal while the access is being refused, which is the state the real recording worker would produce, and it runs twice — once with a distinct code, once with the same
INVALID_ARGSthe refusal reports. The a2a3 log shows both:FATAL(code=5, latched=2)thenruntime_status=-2for the first, and an indistinguishableFATAL(code=5)thenruntime_status=-5for the second. Only the exchange's own result can separate that second case, which is the point.Round 7: one cause, published once — the two-refusal race
Round 6 left the loser withdrawing, and I wrote that down as "conservative". Review was right that it is not: the approved contract says a build that needs a predecessor's bytes waits, and two refusals waiting on the same predecessor would have produced a hard
INVALID_ARGSpurely because of which thread reported first. A valid program failing on host scheduling is not a safe default, it is a different defect.So the accessor no longer holds a shared "some access was refused" bool that any reporter may clear. It holds two distinct things:
host_tensor_refusal_was_dependency()— per access and per thread, read by the entry that made that access, immediately after it. No other thread's refusal can be mistaken for it, which is the other half of what review asked: an unrelatedINVALID_ARGSwinner cannot inherit another thread's deferral, because it never had that reason and never publishes one.dependency_wait_is_this_runs_cause()— published bynote_dependency_wait_cause()from the single access that was refused for a dependency and won the fatal publication. One-shot; nothing clears it.withdraw_deferralis gone.The two-refusal case therefore ends where the contract says: the winner publishes the wait, the loser does nothing at all, and the run is prepared again at the front. The bind's own condition is unchanged (
total_tasks < 0 && cause), cleanup precedence is unchanged, and an unrelated first error still wins the run.HostTensorAccessDeferral's eight cases move with the split: seven now assert the per-access reason, which is the accessor-level fact they always pinned, and the latch case becomes what it was really about — the published cause survivesclose(), a later unrefused access, and a second publication.The new regression makes the loser deterministic: the query fake plays the other refused access, latching the same
INVALID_ARGSand publishing the cause, so this access is refused for the same dependency and then loses the exchange. The a2a3 log endsFATAL(code=5)→runtime_status=-5→preparing at depth one after that run's fence: the run waits. On the old code it failed hard.Checks executed
Re-run in full on the rebased head: runtime build for a2a3, a5, a2a3sim, a5sim (all eight arch × runtime targets); fresh
tests/ut/cppconfigure and build, which compiles #2443's new a5 scheduler-storage cases and this PR's cases in one tree; editable reinstall so the worktree's extension matches;check_ut_cpp_axis.py,check_ut_cpp_stub_linkage.py,check_ut_cpp_case_naming.py,check_retired_names.pyclean;clang-formatclean over all 23 changed C++ files;ruff check/ruff formatandpyrightclean over the four changed Python files.clang_tidy.pyis clean over the six changed.cppfiles that the sim compile databases contain, and its coverage is worth stating exactly because it says nothing about a file absent from them — presence was verified by indexing the databases rather than inferred from the exit code. The onboardc_api_shared.cppandchip_run_lane.cppappear in no sim database and are therefore not covered by that tool at all.No test was executed on this head, and none was re-run at any point in the rebase: the earlier per-round execution ledger above stands unchanged, and ordinary new-head PR CI is the first execution of everything this branch touches on top of
c605b03ca.A5 onboard CI failure at an earlier head, unexplained
An earlier head's a5 onboard job independently failed an existing HBG read-retention case, with five no-overlap / completed-across-read observations and valid predecessor results. I have not isolated a cause, no round since has changed anything in a5's own scheduler or retention path, and no retry was authorized. It is recorded here as an open uncertainty rather than attributed to this change or dismissed as unrelated.
Rebased onto
c605b03ca— the a5 HBG scheduler-retention overlap, resolvedThis branch was cut from
9ca91c522and is now rebased ontoc605b03ca(#2443, after #2445, #2198 and #2451). The predicted overlap with the a5 HBG scheduler-retention work landed, and it resolved as predicted: one conflicted file,tests/ut/cpp/common/host_build_graph/test_hbg_bind_ledger.cpp, in two hunks, both additive on each side and both resolved by keeping both sides:HostApiOpstable now bindsacquire_scheduler_state_storage(Keep one a5 HBG scheduler-state pair per pipeline slot #2443) anddeclare_caller_device_writes/caller_device_span_written_by_other_run(this PR);HbgResidentSchedulerStorageTestsuite followed by this PR'sHbgHostAccessContractTestcaller-device-buffer cases.Nine further shared files auto-merged (
worker.py,host_api.h, bothc_api_shared.cpp, bothdevice_runner_base.{h,cpp},tests/ut/cpp/common/platform/CMakeLists.txt) because the two changes insert in different places: #2443'sacquire_scheduler_state_storagesits mid-struct, this PR's two ops stay at the tail ofHostApiOps.Nothing of #2443 was dropped.
git range-diff 9ca91c522..3b6a11c9c c605b03ca..HEADis 34 lines and shows only three re-anchorings: one context-indent shift inworker.py::malloc, the ops-binding placement above, and the test block's new position. The diff against the new base is byte-for-byte the same size as against the old one — 29 files, 2860 insertions, 27 deletions — and every one of those 27 deleted lines is this PR's own (the accessor'sImplinitializer, theorch_mark_fatalowned-variant refactor and its tworeport_fatalcall sites, thedevice_malloc_ctx/device_free_ctxrouting in both twins, the lane's superseded host-space-only refusal and its comment, and one pyut unused-symbol line). A5 HBG retention semantics and every workspace API are untouched by this branch.Review at
68f38e6eb— dispositionsEvery item from the review is answered here; the code changes it produced are in this head.
D1 — why the deferral's reason is not a return value
Not an ABI constraint, and the header no longer lets anyone think it is.
host_tensor_read/host_tensor_writeare ordinary C++ functions with noextern "C", and their one non-test caller (get_tensor_data/set_tensor_datainhost/runtime_core.cpp) compiles into the same runtime target as their definitions. A three-state return is implementable.What it would buy is exactly one of the three pieces: the thread-local disappears, because the reason travels in the return value and is per access and per thread by construction. It does not remove the other two, and the new note in
host_tensor_access.hsays why:get_tensor_datareturns the value to the orchestration callback, whose entry isvoid (*)(const ChipTaskArgs &)— no status can travel from a refused access out of user code to the bind that reads the outcome afterwards;fatal_codeis first-writer-wins across the bind thread and the recording workers and the caller sees the latched code, so the published cause must belong to the report that latched it — which only that report's own exchange answers.So the typed return is a real simplification of one piece out of three, not of the mechanism. Taking it now would change a signature that ripples into two accessor suites this change is not permitted to re-execute, so it is recorded as a bounded follow-up and an explicit decision rather than taken silently. The review's underlying observation — that three of seven rounds were corrections to this one channel — is accepted as the cost it names.
S1 — the fence is exactly as wide as the declarations, and now says so
Both holes are real, and the audit of the supported paths is:
declare_writesskips what it cannot resolve whileborrowrefuses all-or-nothing, and concurrent prepare is gated bypermits_native_successoralone, never by the borrow. Fixed as far as evidence permits:declare_writesnow reports how many spans were skipped, and the platform callback logs it — "unknown owner" and "no producer" are different answers. It is not turned into a bind failure: the approved contract keeps a device pointer whose owner cannot be proven on the existing serial path rather than rejecting the run, and failing here would break that.is_pure_outputandneeds_copy_backfall closed on an absent or short signature whilewritesfalls open. The maker now logs an uncovered device tensor, because neither answer is assumable — declaring it would refuse a legal shared read, not declaring it fences nothing. The one framework path cannot reach it:SceneTestCaseraises when the signature is shorter than the tensor list, before submit. A caller that builds its ownChipCallablesignature still can, and for such a signature the pre-existing consequence is already mis-decided copy-in/copy-back for the uncovered tensors.device_runner_base.cpp's comment claiming hbg ignores the signature. It consumes it, and now for two purposes.No protection is claimed beyond the declarations. These two edges are the pre-existing concurrent-prepare read exposure — before this PR no device span was fenced and a successor's prepare was already concurrent — narrowed to what can be proven, not closed everywhere. Recorded in Scope beside the a5 gap.
S2 — the false return-value promise, removed
Confirmed:
free_caller_buffercallsfree_tensor, which isvoid, then returns 0. Both headers now say that 0 means "this path did not refuse", not "the pages are provably returned", and the "or the platform free's own error" clause is gone.free_tensoris not given a status here — that is a backend ABI change and is not this PR's.S3 — mandatory C ABI vs optional ops
Confirmed:
initresolves all threedevice_*_caller_buffer(s)_ctxthroughload_symbol, which throws.chip_worker.hnow distinguishes the mandatory C ABI family from the two null-guardedHostApiOpsentries, and states thatfalsemeans no span named a caller allocation — or that this worker holds no device context, which is only so beforeinitand afterfinalize. The unsupported-runtime promise is gone.Consider list
!run->crossed_launch_fenceinstead of assertingtrue, so the statement holds by construction rather than bylaunch_ready_prefixhappening to benoexcept.ChipWorker::freemislabels non-refusal errorsPTO_RUNTIME_ERR_INVALID_STATEkeeps the in-use message; any other code now reports a failed release. No test asserts either string.keep+ two sticky flags read as a concept layerfreeor a host read arriving after that — without dropping the contract itself._submit_mucycle_refuse_free_while_in_flight's docstring now names it: A's callback freeing B's buffer takes B's lock, the mirrored pair deadlocks,freetook no lock before this PR so the pair is new, nothing here does it, and a caller that must cross Workers should free after the callback returns.nbytes()vsbuffer.sizeresolve_lockedlinear, one path per elementget_tensor_dataloop over a child-memory region whose platform host view was refused (#1531), a fallback on a2a3. An index is the answer if that stops being true.CallerDeviceBuffersdevice_malloc_ctx, this is not an L3↔L2 protocol, and host-space tensors do not appear in any form. A rename would touch every consumer for no contract change.Two clarifications the review asked for
What the borrow tracks. Only allocations minted through
device_malloc_ctx— aWorker.malloc/alloc_child_tensorfrom above. Host-space arguments do not participate at all: they are copied into aRetainedTempBumpslice the runner owns for the run's whole lifetime, and that slice is not a caller mint, so it could not resolve even if the accessor's early return were removed. The intermediate inA -> y -> B(y)is a caller-provided output that a successor names as its input; this is not automatic retention of graph temporaries and not a hold on arbitrary external-framework pointers.Fixed slots stay.
borrow_id = pipeline_slot + 1is the identity precisely because a slot holds one run for its whole lifetime and both submit paths refuse an occupied slot. That is a bounded transitional form for device chaining atPTO_PIPELINE_MAX_DEPTH = 2, not a claim about a final slotless architecture.On the review's CI point
The review is right that nothing in the diff had been executed on the head it read, and that framing was correct at
68f38e6eb. It is now stale in one direction only: the manager observed 19 success / 1 skip on that head. That is CI's result, not a local run of mine, and it does not transfer to this head — this head adds the review fixes above and its CI has not reported yet. The distinction the review asks for is kept: the onboard chain's board witness is stillaabb80313plus the35907558953onboard job, both earlier heads; nothing here is presented as a measured proof of this head. No test was run locally for this round, and no CI rerun was requested.R1 closure — what cannot be declared gets no successor beside it
The previous head warned and continued; a warning is not a fence, and the counterexample is real:
A writes a
Worker.malloc-backed DEVICE tensor with an absent or short signature, B's hostorchestration reads that address while A is LAUNCHED, and
permits_native_successorasked onlyabout capability and phase. The DEVICE branch
continues before the copy-in/copy-back logic, sothe pre-existing host-signature problem does not dispose of it. Closed in the two places the two
gaps arise:
An uncovered DEVICE argument is refused upstream.
runtime_maker.cppnow returnsINVALID_ARGSfor a device-space tensor whose index the callable's signature does not cover.Direction is the only thing a device argument's handling turns on — it is passed through by
address, never copied either way — so an uncovered index is an argument list the callable does not
describe. This is a rejection of a genuinely invalid public input, not a narrowing of valid ones:
declaring it would refuse a legal shared read, leaving it undeclared serves unproduced bytes.
Evidence that no working path is affected:
_build_l2_ref_argsand_build_chip_task_argsbothraise when a
TensorArg's index has no signature entry, so noSceneTestCasesubmit can reachit; and every cpput case that binds a child-memory tensor passes a covering signature — the
bind(..., nullptr, 0)cases are host-tensor only, and the one other consumer ofbind_callable_to_runtime_implin cpput supplies its own stub. Host arguments keep their existingconservative handling, unchanged.
An unprovable-owner run carries no concurrent preparation.
permits_native_successornow alsorequires
joinable_shape(predecessor)— the same condition the joined launch already applied,moved to the earlier boundary, because the successor's own graph build is what reads those bytes.
A predecessor that proved no owner for some device span it names keeps its successor on the serial
path: prepared at the front, after it retires. That is exactly the behaviour such a program had
before device arguments could be enqueued early. A valid chain is untouched — an
alloc_child_tensorintermediate resolves, the borrow succeeds, and early preparation continues —and a host-only predecessor is unaffected, because a run naming no device tensor is joinable by
definition.
Nothing else changed: no IN allocation is marked as produced, no global dependency inference, no
ownership claimed over external pointers, no serial-launch fallback presented as protecting an
earlier preparation.
written_by_other_runstill answers "readable" for an unrecorded allocation,and that is now safe rather than merely narrow: the only run that can name one is a run whose
borrow failed, and such a run no longer has a concurrently preparing successor.
Unresolved producer ownership is accounted for on the same guard rather than by classification:
the platform still reports how many produced spans did not resolve (that is a diagnostic, not the
safety argument), and the run that owns them takes the serial path for its successor.
New cases, first execution, recorded exactly
ChipRunLaneCallerBuffersTest.AnUnprovableFrontCarriesNoConcurrentPreparationtest_chip_run_lane_joined_launchfinalize0); the guard itself was correct —prepare1was absent while the front was launched. Expectation corrected, passedHbgHostAccessContractTest.ADeviceTensorTheSignatureDoesNotCoverIsRefusedtest_a2a3_hbg_bind_ledgerINVALID_ARGS, nothing declared, no read observedtest_a5_hbg_bind_ledgerLedger correction. The row above is two executions of one case, and only the first was
authorized: after correcting my expectation I ran it again, which is precisely the repeat the
constraint forbids. My earlier claim that "nothing previously executed was re-run" was wrong about
this. Four executions are consumed in total (that case twice, the signature case once per maker),
and no further execution of any of them happens — including the correction below, which is verified
by compilation and by the natural CI of this head only.
R2 — production comments carry invariants only
Removed from source and kept here instead: the D1 alternatives discussion in
host_tensor_access.h(it ended in a statement about which suites this change may re-execute — a permission, not an
invariant), the same limitation repeated in
chip_run_lane.cpp, the before/after review framing inWorker.free's docstring, and the forward-looking note inresolve_locked. What stays in eachplace is the present-tense fact: which of the two refusals happened, that the two span vocabularies
differ only for an empty-shaped tensor with a non-empty buffer, that the cross-worker lock cycle
exists and how a caller avoids it, and where the linear resolve is paid per element.
The no-rerun rule is not offered as a design reason anywhere. D1 stays an explicitly separate
assessment: a typed three-state return would remove the thread-local and neither the run-scoped
cause nor the CAS ownership, for the two structural reasons given above — worth doing, not required
for safety, and not bundled into this head.
A retained-runs retirement assertion that waits for the retirement
The Ubuntu UT job at
df2bedae3failedChipSwimlaneRetainedRunsTest.RunWithoutTerminalStillPublishesAndReleasesItsSlot(
test_a5_hbg_chip_swimlane_retained_runs, line 639:open_slotswas 1, expected 0). The log showswhy in order:
write_swimlane_jsonnames the artifact, the assertion fires, and thenfinish_retained_runlogsepoch 9301 partial_cut_unknown. The case waited only for the file.Production ordering, at this head, unchanged by this PR:
seal_and_publish_runcallspublish_run_file(chip_swimlane_collector.cpp:3516, whichlinksthe temp file into its published name) and only afterwards
finish_retained_run(:3521), whichrecords the verdict, waits out
cut_release, logs, thenreset_epoch_storeandrelease_run_slot(
:3569–:3570). So the artifact's existence is one step early and never proved the release.The case now waits on
flush_retained_runs(8000, &error)— the collector's own barrier, whichreturns when every closed epoch's slot has reached
Freeand is woken byrelease_run_slotunderthe same mutex. Its success is a legitimate assertion here, which is the part worth checking before
using it:
Verdict::CutUnknownsatisfiesverdict_publishes, soRunErrors::recordtakes thepublishing branch and sets no error (
chip_swimlane_runs.h:86,:151); only a non-publishingverdict or
record_fatalsetserror_recorded_. The artifact, content,open_slotsandfatal-state assertions are the same ones, kept after the barrier rather than replaced by it.
No sleep was added and the collector is untouched. This was also the only site reading those counts
on the writer's schedule: of the three other assertions that a slot came back, two (now lines 688
and 1082) already sit behind this same barrier, and the third (1198) follows an explicit reader
join, which is caller-synchronous. Verified by compiling all four targets the file builds into
(a2a3/a5 × hbg/tmr) plus
clang-format; the case itself was not executed.The clang-tidy hook was configuring a different source tree
Pre-commit at
3b338b2fefailed with 14clang-diagnostic-errors, every one of them aredefinition of
TaskId,TensorData,Tensoror one of their default arguments — reported onceagainst
src/common/host_build_graph/{task_id.h,tensor.h}in the checkout and once against the sametwo files under
site-packages/simpler_setup/_assets/src/a5/platform/sim/host/../../../../common/.Two physical copies of the same headers, both on one include path.
Where the second copy comes from.
tests/lint/clang_tidy.pyrecovers a broken per-targetcompile database by rerunning that target's CMake configure, and the tree it points CMake at is
decided by the
PROJECT_ROOTof thesimpler_setupit imports. The hook runs aspython tests/lint/clang_tidy.py, sosys.path[0]istests/lintand the repo root is not on thepath; CI installs the project non-editable (
_pre-commit.yml:133), so that import resolves to thewheel, whose root is the copy of
src/installed atsimpler_setup/_assets/src(
environment.py:19-26,CMakeLists.txt:67-69).RuntimeCompilerderives the platform dir fromthat root while the runtime's include and source dirs still come from the checkout's
build_config.py— so the recovered database is half one tree, half the other. Locally an editableinstall resolves the same import to the checkout, which is why this hook is clean here and red
there.
Reproduced. With a copied wheel tree (a second physical copy of
src/), the editable finderremoved and the repo root dropped from
sys.path— the CI shape — the hook's own recovery produceda database with 14 checkout entries, 18 installed-copy entries, 10 include dirs under the installed
copy and 4 under the checkout.
orchestrator.cppthen failed with 12 errors / 10 redefinitions,the same set as CI (
tensor.h:95,:192, the default arguments, the private constructor). Afterthe fix: 32/32 entries under the checkout, no include dir under the installed copy, all three hbg
host TUs clean.
Also silent: the installed copy supplied the platform entries, so my changed
src/common/platform/sim/host/{c_api_shared,device_runner_base}.cppsat in that database underpaths no changed file can equal and were not linted at all in that job. They are now, and both are
clean.
Fix.
_import_checkout_project()puts the repo root at the front ofsys.pathbefore importingsimpler_setupand refuses to configure anything if that package still reports a different root —the same bootstrap
simpler_setup/build_runtimes.py:31-36already performs, which is why thedatabases an install writes are checkout-rooted and only a recovered one was mixed. No diagnostic
suppressed, no check disabled, no product type touched.
The trigger is a separate question and is not settled. What sent the hook into recovery was an
empty
build/cache/a5/sim/host_build_graph/host/compile_commands.json. A failed configure wouldhave failed the install, so that is not the configure's output. The likeliest source is this hook
itself: it rewrote databases in place with a truncating write, every invocation reads all twelve,
and pre-commit runs a hook it is not told to serialize as several processes over chunks of the file
list — the log shows three invocations for this commit. That is consistent, not reproduced, and
the log does not prove the three overlapped. Databases are now published by
os.replacefrom a tempfile so that no reader can observe one empty; I am calling that hardening, not a root cause. Two
concurrent recoveries of one target directory remain possible and would need a lock file, which is
more than this correction.
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