Please report security issues privately. Do NOT open a public issue.

• Email: chunxiaoxx@gmail.com (PGP key on nautilus.social/security)
• Backup: file an issue with the label security:embargo (we'll respond and move discussion privately)

We aim to respond within 72 hours.

compass handles sensitive memory data. Our threat model assumes:

• The local machine running the plugin (we don't defend against local malware that could read .cache/ directly)
• The bge-m3 daemon (local Unix socket)
• Volc Ark / Anthropic / similar LLM providers (in their security domain)

• Network in transit (compass.nautilus.social uses HTTPS)
• Other tenants on shared infrastructure
• Disk persistence on cloud (we plan E2EE in v1.0)
• Backup chain (we don't yet ship encrypted backups)

We follow a 90-day disclosure policy:

1. Day 0: report received
2. Day 0-7: acknowledged, severity triaged
3. Day 7-30: fix developed
4. Day 30-90: rolled out · users notified
5. Day 90+: public disclosure if not fixed (or earlier if exploited)

• Drift detection false positives: this is a model accuracy issue, not security
• Memory recall false positives: same
• Plugin not running: see INSTALL.md troubleshooting

• Pre-v1.0 builds store memory in plaintext at rest (encrypted disk recommended for sensitive deployments)
• bge-m3 daemon listens on 127.0.0.1:9876 by default · not exposed to network · but a local user can read .cache/
• No certificate pinning yet (relies on system trust store)
• No content security policy on landing page

(Reporters who responsibly disclosed vulnerabilities will be listed here · with permission.)

• None yet

We don't run a paid bounty (yet). When the Nautilus platform launches its public mainnet, we expect to fund one tied to stake economy. Until then: thanks + GitHub credit.