Update dependency org.postgresql:postgresql to v42.7.12 [SECURITY]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
org.postgresql:postgresql (source)	42.7.9 → 42.7.12

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pgjdbc: Unbounded PBKDF2 iterations in SCRAM authentication allows CPU exhaustion DoS

CVE-2026-42198 / GHSA-98qh-xjc8-98pq

More information

Details

Summary

pgjdbc is vulnerable to a client-side denial of service during SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication.

Impact

A malicious server can instruct the driver to perform SCRAM authentication with a very large iteration count.
With a large enough value, the client spends an unbounded amount of CPU time inside PBKDF2 before authentication can fail.
A single attempt ties up a CPU core. Repeated or concurrent attempts exhaust client CPU and can wedge connection pools.

In affected versions, loginTimeout did not fully mitigate this problem. When loginTimeout expired, the caller could stop waiting, but the worker thread performing the connection attempt could continue running and burning CPU inside the SCRAM PBKDF2 computation.

This issue affects availability. It does not provide authentication bypass, privilege escalation, or direct password disclosure.

A user is vulnerable when all of the following are true:

1. The connection uses SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication.
2. The client reaches a malicious, compromised, or attacker-controlled PostgreSQL endpoint.
3. That endpoint sends a very large SCRAM PBKDF2 iteration count in the server-first-message.

In practice, that can happen in these situations:

• the application lets end users or tenants supply their own database connection details (as in many BI, reporting, analytics, ETL, and low-code platforms), so a user can point the shared client host at a server they control
• the application accepts connection strings, hostnames, or JDBC URLs from user input, configuration uploaded by users, or other untrusted sources
• the application is configured to connect to a PostgreSQL server that is itself malicious or later becomes compromised
• the application connects through an untrusted proxy, relay, tunnel, bastion, or connection-pooling service that can act as the PostgreSQL server
• an attacker can redirect the client to a fake PostgreSQL endpoint by manipulating DNS, service discovery, Kubernetes service resolution, /etc/hosts, environment variables, or similar indirection
• an active network attacker on the path can impersonate the server because the connection does not strongly verify server identity (for example, sslmode lower than verify-full, or trusting a CA that signs hosts outside the operator's control)

The issue is more damaging when the application uses connection retries, many parallel connection attempts, or loginTimeout and assumes the timeout fully stops the work.

Patches

The patch introduces a new connection property, scramMaxIterations, with a default of 100K. The client now rejects SCRAM server messages that advertise more PBKDF2 iterations than the configured cap before starting the PBKDF2 computation begins.

Workarounds

Until a patched version of pgjdbc is deployed, the following measures reduce exposure:

1. Only connect to trusted PostgreSQL servers whose identity is verified.
   Connect only to trusted PostgreSQL servers, and verify server identity with TLS using sslmode=verify-full and a trusted CA.
   TLS without certificate and hostname verification is not sufficient as an active network attacker can still impersonate the server.

2. Do not rely on loginTimeout as a complete mitigation on unpatched versions.
   On affected versions, loginTimeout can stop the waiting caller while the worker thread continues spending CPU.

3. Avoid SCRAM on untrusted or interceptable connection paths.
   For those paths, use an authentication method that does not let the server choose a SCRAM PBKDF2 iteration count.

4. Reduce blast radius operationally.
   Limit parallel connection attempts, add retry backoff, isolate connection establishment in a separate worker or process when possible, and apply CPU or container limits where appropriate.

5. On trusted servers you control, keep SCRAM iteration counts at ordinary values.
   This does not defend against an attacker-controlled server, but it avoids unnecessary client cost when talking to legitimate servers.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/security/advisories/GHSA-98qh-xjc8-98pq
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42198
• https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/releases/tag/REL42.7.11
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-98qh-xjc8-98pq

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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PostgreSQL JDBC Driver: Silent channel-binding authentication downgrade via unsupported certificate algorithms

CVE-2026-54291 / GHSA-j92g-9f8w-j867

More information

Details

Impact

channelBinding=require connections can be silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS (with channel binding) to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 (without it), losing the man-in-the-middle protection the setting is meant to guarantee. An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection triggers the downgrade with a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash. Examples are Ed25519, Ed448, and post-quantum algorithms.

Two issues combine in releases 42.7.4 through 42.7.11:

1. The bundled com.ongres.scram:scram-client (3.1 or 3.2) returns an empty byte array instead of failing when it cannot derive the binding hash for such a certificate. This is the library issue tracked as GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf.
2. pgJDBC does not enforce channelBinding=require where it matters. ScramAuthenticator checks only that the server advertised a -PLUS mechanism; it neither rejects the empty binding nor checks that the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding. The connection therefore downgrades silently, and would do so even against a fixed scram-client, because the missing enforcement is in pgJDBC's own code.

Only connections that set channelBinding=require are affected. Under the default prefer policy, and under allow or disable, falling back to plain SCRAM is the documented behaviour. Releases before 42.7.4 are unaffected, because they do not support channel binding.

Patches

Fixed in pgJDBC 42.7.12. pgJDBC now enforces channel binding in its own code, independently of the scram-client version:

• Under channelBinding=require, it fails the connection when no channel-binding data can be extracted from the server certificate, instead of passing an empty value to the SCRAM client. The error names the certificate signature algorithm.
• After negotiation, it requires the selected mechanism to use channel binding (a -PLUS mechanism) whenever channelBinding=require is set, regardless of how negotiation resolved.

Upgrade to 42.7.12 or later.

Workarounds

No pgJDBC setting restores channel-binding enforcement on an affected release; upgrading is the fix.

If you cannot upgrade immediately, verify the server certificate at the TLS layer so that a man-in-the-middle cannot present a substitute certificate. Set sslmode=verify-full with a truststore that contains only your server's CA. This defence is independent of channel binding and blocks the same attacker. Connections that rely on channelBinding=require in place of certificate verification have no equivalent workaround and should upgrade.

References

• GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf — the related com.ongres.scram:scram-client issue (root cause of the empty channel-binding value).
• scram-client 3.3 release (library fix): https://github.com/ongres/scram/releases/tag/3.3
• pgJDBC fix in 42.7.12: commit

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/security/advisories/GHSA-j92g-9f8w-j867
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54291
• https://github.com/pgjdbc/pgjdbc/commit/77df98e4e66c12936ded3478a0954f6f580bad99
• https://github.com/ongres/scram/releases/tag/3.3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j92g-9f8w-j867

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

pgjdbc/pgjdbc (org.postgresql:postgresql)

v42.7.12

Security

• fix: Enforce SCRAM channel-binding policy and prevent silent downgrade.
  Under channelBinding=require, the driver silently downgraded from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS (with channel binding) to plain SCRAM-SHA-256 (without it) when the server presented a certificate whose signature algorithm has no tls-server-end-point channel-binding hash (e.g. Ed25519, Ed448, or post-quantum algorithms). An attacker who can intercept the TLS connection could exploit this to strip channel-binding protection.
  The fix enforces channel binding in the driver's own code: it now fails the connection when no binding data can be extracted, and verifies the negotiated mechanism uses channel binding (-PLUS) when require is set.
  Only connections that set channelBinding=require are affected. The default prefer policy and releases before 42.7.4 (which introduced channel-binding support) are unaffected.
  See the Security Advisory for more detail.
  The following CVE-2026-54291 has been issued.

v42.7.11

Security

• fix: Limit SCRAM PBKDF2 iterations accepted from the server.
  pgjdbc was vulnerable to a client-side denial of service in SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication, where a malicious or compromised PostgreSQL server could specify an extremely large PBKDF2 iteration count, causing the client to consume unbounded CPU and potentially exhaust connection pools. The fix introduces a new scramMaxIterations connection property (defaulting to 100,000) to cap iteration counts before computation begins.
  See the Security Advisory for more detail.
  The following CVE-2026-42198 has been issued.

Added

• feat: implement require_auth connection property, aligning with libpq behavior PR #​3895

Changed

• chore: replace Appveyor CI with ikalnytskyi/action-setup-postgres PR #​3966
• chore: upgrade Gradle to v9 PR #​3978

Fixed

• fix: ensure extended protocol messages end with Sync message PR #​3728
• fix: enable cursor-based fetching in extended protocol when transaction started via SQL command PR #​3996
• fix: retry with SSL on IOException when sslMode=ALLOW PR #​3973
• fix: make sure the driver honours connectTimeout when retrying the connection PR #​3968
• fix: allow fallback to non-SSL connection when sslMode=prefer and sslResponseTimeout kicks in PR #​3968
• fix: catch SecurityException from setContextClassLoader on ForkJoinPool workers PR #​3962
• fix: use compareTo for LogSequenceNumber comparison to handle unsigned values correctly PR #​3961
• fix: release COPY lock on IOException to prevent connection hang PR #​3957
• fix: return jsonb as PGObject instead of String PR #​3956
• fix: align SSL key file permission check with libpq PR #​3952
• fix: guard connection closed flag with a reentrant lock to protect against concurrent close PR #​3905

v42.7.10

Changed

• chore: Migrate to Shadow 9 PR 3931
• style: fix empty line before javadoc for checkstyle compliance PR #​3925
• style: fix lambda argument indentation for checkstyle compliance PR #​3922
• test: add autosave=always|never|conservative and cleanupSavepoints=true|false to the randomized CI jobs PR #​3917

Fixed

• fix: non-standard strings failing test for version 19 PR #​3934
• fix: small issues in ConnectionFactoryImpl PR #​3929
• fix: process pending responses before fastpath to avoid protocol errors PR # 3913
• doc: use.md, fix typos PR #​3911
• doc: datasource.md, fix minor formatting issue PR #​3912
• doc: add the new PGP signing key to the official documentation PR #​3912

Reverted

• Revert "fix: make all Calendar instances proleptic Gregorian (#​3837) (#​3887)" PR #​3932

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