Attendix-tgl/docker-compose.caddy.yml at master · thearpankumar/Attendix-tgl · GitHub

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# Reverse proxy + brute-force ban layer for production. Kept in its own file
# so routine app work on docker-compose.prod.yml never has the proxy/security
# config in view. fail2ban is bundled here (not the app file) since it only
# watches Caddy's own log volume and depends_on: caddy.
#
# Always run together with the other prod files:
#   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml -f docker-compose.postgres.yml -f docker-compose.caddy.yml up -d --build
services:

  caddy:
    image: caddy:2-alpine
    container_name: attendance-caddy
    restart: unless-stopped
    security_opt:
      - no-new-privileges:true
    cap_drop:
      - ALL
    cap_add:
      - CHOWN
      - DAC_OVERRIDE
      - NET_BIND_SERVICE
      - SETGID
      - SETUID
    read_only: true
    tmpfs:
      - /tmp
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "wget", "-q", "-O", "/dev/null", "http://localhost:2019/metrics"]
      interval: 30s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 3
      start_period: 10s
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          cpus: '1'
          memory: 512M
    ports:
      - "80:80"
      - "443:443"
    volumes:
      - ./Caddyfile.prod:/etc/caddy/Caddyfile:ro
      - caddy_data:/data
      - caddy_config:/config
      - caddy_logs:/var/log/caddy
    environment:
      - DOMAIN=${DOMAIN:-xenkrypt.in}
    depends_on:
      - backend
      - admin-frontend
      - mentor-frontend
      - student-frontend
      - home-frontend
    networks:
      - web-net
      # So Prometheus can scrape the metrics-only :2019 listener without
      # Prometheus having to sit on web-net alongside the frontends.
      - monitoring-net

  # ponytail: only bans anything on a real Linux Docker host (needs the host
  # firewall via DOCKER-USER) — inert but harmless on Docker Desktop dev.
  # NET_ADMIN/NET_RAW + host networking are inherent to what fail2ban does
  # (manipulating the host's iptables DOCKER-USER chain), so cap_drop: ALL
  # isn't an option here — no-new-privileges still applies as defense in depth.
  fail2ban:
    image: crazymax/fail2ban:latest
    container_name: attendance-fail2ban
    restart: unless-stopped
    network_mode: host
    security_opt:
      - no-new-privileges:true
    cap_add:
      - NET_ADMIN
      - NET_RAW
    environment:
      - TZ=UTC
      - F2B_LOG_TARGET=STDOUT
    volumes:
      - ./fail2ban:/data
      - caddy_logs:/var/log/caddy:ro
    depends_on:
      - caddy

volumes:
  caddy_data:
  caddy_config:
  caddy_logs:

networks:
  monitoring-net:
    external: true
  web-net:
    driver: bridge